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Abstract
A Generic Attack on CubeHash, a SHA-3 Candidate
Philip C. Doughty, Jr.
Supervising Professors:
Prof. Marcin Łukowiak & Prof. Alan Kaminsky
A secure cryptographic hashing function should be resistant to three differ-
ent scenarios: First, a cryptographic hashing function must be preimage re-
sistant, that is, it should be infeasible for an attacker to construct a message
such that it produces a known hash output value. Second, a cryptographic
hashing function must be second preimage resistant, or it should be infea-
sible for an attacker to construct a message such that it has the same hash
output value as another known message. Third, a cryptographic hashing
function must be collision resistant, which means that it should be infeasi-
ble for an attacker to find any two different messages such that their hash
output values are the same.
The current Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family, namely SHA-1 and
SHA-2, were designed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and pub-
lished by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Recent
advances in cryptanalysis of hash functions have led to concerns about the
collision resistance in the SHA family. To address these concerns, NIST has
opened a public worldwide competition known as the SHA-3 competition to
find the new hash function, which will become SHA-3. Each candidate hash
function is scrutinized by the public, and candidates with found weaknesses
are dropped from advancing to the next rounds of the competition. The goal
is that the strongest hash function will emerge at the end of the competition,
and this hash function will be free for everyone to use.
This thesis implemented a generic attack against the collision resistance
of small variants of one candidate in the SHA-3 competition, CubeHash.
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A unique hash-chaining approach was used to find the collisions, and the
parallelization of several FPGAs lead to parallelization measurements and
analysis to see if a linear speedup could be obtained.
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Often in computing it is necessary to convert an arbitrary piece of data into a
fixed length, typically small, digest. The algorithm which takes an arbitrary
piece of data and transforms it into a fixed length digest is usually referred to
as a hash function. A hash function will always produce the same output if
given the same input. It is usually desirable that the hash function has a high
level of uniformity in mapping an input to an output; each possible output
digest should have an equal probability of occurring. It is also desirable that
the hash function have a high throughput; in other words, it is desirable for
a hash function to be able to process a large amount of data in a short time.
Bit Index 0 – 15 16 – 31
0 Source Port Number Destination Port Number
32 Length Checksum
64 Data
Table 1.1: UDP Packet Layout
One application of a hash function is the checksum. Checksums can be
found in areas where it is possible for data to become corrupted. This data
corruption can be found in almost any, if not all, transmissions over a phys-
ical medium. On the Internet, for example, there are a number of scenarios
where data that is in transmission could have one or more bits flipped to
the opposite value. User Data Protocol (UDP) packets [10], outlined in Ta-
ble 1.1, utilize checksums to detect such corruption. In UDP packets, 16-bit
words in the packet are added together in one’s complement format to pro-
duce a sum. The one’s complement of the sum is then stored in the UDP
packet in the checksum field. The idea behind this checksum, is that it is
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possible for a few bits in the packet to become flipped due to transmission
error, but it is unlikely that both the bits in the packet and the bits in the
checksum field to be flipped in such a way that when the receiver of the






















































Figure 1.1: Illustration of Linear Search, Binary Search, and a Hash Table
Another use of the hash function is in hash tables. The hash table is a
construct used to store a large amount of data efficiently. Data is typically
stored as a Key-Value pair. The Key is a unique identifier, and the Value
could be any arbitrary piece of data. For example, in a school database
system, the Key could be the student’s name, and the Value could be the
student’s entire academic history. If these Key-Value pairs were just stored
in an unordered array, it would take a very long time to retrieve a student’s
academic history, because a query would have to go element by element
in the array to see if it was the desired student. This algorithm would run
in O(n) time, where n is the number of students. This is shown on the
left in Figure 1.1 when searching for the student Harold. If the Key-Value
pairs were stored in an ordered array, it would provide a speedup because
a query could then perform a binary search to find a student’s academic
history in O(log n) time. This is shown in the center of Figure 1.1; the
students are sorted alphabetically by name, so it only takes at most 3 retries
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to find any student’s academic history. However, a greater speedup still can
be obtained by using a hash table. In a hash table, elements are placed
into array positions based on the hash digest of the Key, such that the Key
with hash digest 0 would be the first element, the Key with hash digest 1
would be the second element, and so on. Since it takes a constant amount
of time to compute the hash digest of each key, a query would run in O(1)
time, because once the hash digest is found, the index within the array can
immediately be found. This is shown on the right in Figure 1.1. In this
example, Harold’s name produces a hash digest of 7, which immediately
points the query to the correct academic history. It should be noted that it is
entirely possible for two Keys to produce the same hash digest, especially if
modular arithmetic is used to wrap the digest around the size of the array. In
practice, there are additional implementation details to handle this problem
in hash tables. Figure 1.1 shows one of these details on the left, which is
having the table partially empty.
The previous two examples of hash functions, checksums and hash ta-
bles, have alluded to a problem that can, and indeed must, occur in hash
functions. That is the problem of a collision. A collision occurs when two
different data inputs to a hash function produce the same output. Since the
hash output is a fixed length, and the hash input could be any length, that
means there are an infinite number of such collisions for each hash function.
This may be acceptable for the two scenarios previously described, but there
are many scenarios where this would have disastrous consequences.
A cryptographic hash function is a hash function that also provides three
basic security properties. It must be preimage resistant, which means that
it should be infeasible to construct input data that will match a known hash
digest. Secondly, a cryptographic hash function must be second preimage
resistant, which means that it should be infeasible to construct input data
that will have the same hash digest as another known input data. And finally,
a cryptographic hash function must be collision resistant, which means that
it should be infeasible to find any two different messages such that their
hash digests are the same.
One place where cryptographic hash functions are used is in storing pass-
words for user accounts on various operating systems. It would be insecure
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to store a password in a file on the hard disk, because then if the hard disk
is ever compromised to an attacker, the attacker can easily see what the
password was. So, instead, most operating systems will only store a cryp-
tographic hash digest of the password. When the user types his password
to log in, the computer will compute the hash digest of that password and
see if it matches the value stored on the disk. If it does match, then the user
is permitted to log in. If the hash function used meets the requirements of
a cryptographic hashing algorithm, then this is a more secure way to store
the password on the hard disk. It should be infeasible to find a preimage for
the hash digest stored on the disk, or it should be infeasible to find another
password that, when processed through the cryptographic hash function,
produces the same hash digest that is stored on the disk.
Another place where cryptographic hash functions are present is in places
where data integrity could maliciously be modified. The previous example
of a UDP packet used a checksum which was designed to help prevent ac-
cidental data integrity errors in transmission lines. However, in many cases
there are attackers who will attempt to purposely corrupt data. One example
of this could be a large file distribution center that has a number of volun-
teer mirrors. The main website could give copies of a file to the mirrors,
and then publish the hash digest of the file on the main website and direct
users to the mirrors for downloading. Users could then compute and check
the hash digest of the files they receive to make sure the privately owned
mirror did not alter the file, since it is infeasible for an attacker to produce a
preimage or a data input that matches a hash digest. A similar mechanism is
present in most peer-to-peer file sharing networks. It should be noted that if
the publisher is typically from only one source, a digital signature approach
is more secure than a cryptographic hash function alone.
One of the most commonly discussed places of importance for crypto-
graphic hash functions is in conjunction with digital signatures. In public
key cryptography, there are two keys involved. There is a public key which
is shared with everyone and anyone, and there is a private key which the
user keeps absolutely secret. In public key encryption, the public key is
used to transform data such that only the private key can be used to decrypt
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the data. Conversely, with digital signatures, the private key is used to trans-
form data into a signature such that anyone with the public key can know
that only the owner of the private key could have produced the signature.
There is one unwanted side effect to many digital signature schemes which
is that the signature is approximately the same length as the input data. For
small amounts of data, this may be acceptable, but if the data being signed
is a CD or DVD image, then a user downloading the data would then have
to download an equally large signature just to check the data. A common
compromise is that the data is processed through a cryptographic hash func-
tion and then the digital signature is taken from the hash digest, which is
typically very small, to produce a signature which is also very small, and
the signature is just as valid so long as the hash function is cryptographi-
cally secure. However, if the hash function is not cryptographically secure,
then there could be disastrous effects with computing a digital signature on
the hash digest.
This was the case with MD5 [11] in X.509 certificates [4], in an at-
tack which yielded fraudulent certificates [7]. A common way for web-
sites to secure communications with clients is to use X.509 certificates. In
this scheme, each website that wishes to have secure communication with
clients will generate a public and private key. The website will then generate
a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) based on its public key and some other
identifying information such as the URL of the website and the owner’s
name. The CSR is then passed to a Certificate Authority (CA). The CA’s
purpose is to investigate and ensure the identity of the website. Once the
CA has determined that the identity is legitimate, the CA will then sign the
CSR with the CA’s own private key to generate a X.509 certificate which
is then sent back to the website. The security is ensured based on the fact
that most browsers come with several trusted public keys from various CAs,
and it is infeasible for an attacker to determine a CA’s private key given
only the CA’s public key. Whenever a user establishes a secure connection
with a website, the website sends the user the X.509 certificate, and the
user’s browser automatically verifies the digital signature on the certificate
using the known CA’s public keys. If the signature does not match, then the
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browser will warn the user of possible fraudulent behavior with the web-
site in question. But, as mentioned previously, digital signatures typically
rely on a cryptographic hash function. This is exactly the case with X.509
certificates. X.509 certificates originally used the MD5 cryptographic hash
function, but MD5 was later found to lack a desirable level of collision re-
sistance. Therefore, it was possible for an attacker to generate two different
CSRs with two different, but valid, public keys and the same MD5 hash
digest. The ideal attack would be for one CSR to be a legitimately verifi-
able CSR, while the other CSR would be for a fraudulent organization. The
CA would then perform its due diligence on the legitimate CSR and gen-
erate a X.509 certificate. The fraudulent organization could then just copy
and paste the digital signature from the legitimate X.509 certificate onto the
fraudulent CSR to generate a new X.509 certificate which appeared to be
signed by a CA, even though it was not, and no browser could detect the
forged signature. Other cryptographic hash functions are now used by CAs
to prevent this problem.
The current standard cryptographic hash function is SHA-1 [9]. SHA-1
has been under analysis for some time, because it is used heavily in several
areas and it has a relatively short hash digest of 160 bits. With 160 bits, the
theoretical number of computations required to find a collision is on the or-
der ofO(280) operations, but recently McDonald, Hawkes, and Pieprzyk [8]
found that it is possible to find a collision in about O(252) hash operations.
If collisions could easily be found in SHA-1, then there could be security
problems similar to that of MD5.
There are several successors to SHA-1 known as the SHA-2 family,
which claim to be more secure than SHA-1, but in the interest of prudence,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a global
competition known as the Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition on
November 2, 2007. In this competition, anyone was allowed to submit an
algorithm by October 31, 2008 so long as that algorithm met a certain list
of submission requirements. Throughout the course of the competition, the
public is continually encouraged to examine each candidate to determine
if there are any security vulnerabilities as the primary factor for advance-
ment. Additional factors that will help advance candidates include, but are
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not limited to, efficiency, memory usage, and the performance of hardware
implementations. There are multiple rounds in which several algorithms be-
come eliminated from the competition. The final sole algorithm remaining
will become the new SHA-3 standard.
CubeHash [2] is a candidate developed by Daniel J. Bernstein that was
submitted to the Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition, and Cube-
Hash has advanced to the second round. During the time that CubeHash has
been a candidate, it has been subject to a fair amount of cryptanalysis from
the public. Several attacks on CubeHash can be found in Section 2.2.
This thesis utilized CubeHash as an algorithm in a generic attack. The
generic attack requires a cryptographic hashing algorithm that can be easily





A generic collision search on small variants of the CubeHash cryptographic
hash function was implemented. The data obtained from this collision search
was analyzed to see if multiple processors could provide a parallel speedup
that was directly proportional to the number of processors (a linear speedup).
Three different variants of CubeHash were used. All variants had the
same parameters for bytes of message per set of rounds (32) and number of
rounds between XOR operations with the message (16). The variation was
in the number of bits used as the hash digest. Experiments with 56, 64, and
72-bit hash lengths were performed.
The work presented here relates to the work done by Oorschot and Wiener
[12], which describes the generic hashing attack that forms the foundation
of these experiments. It discusses the concept of feeding the output of a hash
function back into the input of the hashing function until a certain pattern,
called a distinguished value, is found, namely a number of leading zeros.
The paper goes further by describing two pitfalls that can occur. One
pitfall is that one hash chain will intersect with the starting point of another
hash chain (referred to as a Robin Hood). To make the probability of this
pitfall very rare, the proportion of hash outputs that meet the pattern should
be small enough to the point that hash chains are long, which decreases the
probability of running into this problem. The second pitfall is that a hash
chain loops around onto itself without ever meeting the pattern. This thesis
followed the procedure that after a chain reached a length of 20 times the
expected average chain length, that the chain was to be abandoned. The
average expected chain length can be computed by raising 2 to the power
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of the number of static bits in a distinguished value. For example, if a
distinguished value was composed of 25 leading zeros, then the expected


































Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Hash Chain Concept
Figure 2.1 illustrates the hash chain concept that was first proposed by
Oorschot and Wiener [12]. In this diagram, the points represent values
within the hash digest space, S, and the arrows represent computing the
hash function to arrive at another value in the hash space. The white point
represents a distinguished point, or distinguished value.
The chains can start at any arbitrary point within S, and they must end
at a distinguished point. After computing numerous chains, the scenario as
depicted by Chain 3 and Chain 4 in Figure 2.1 should occur if the distin-
guished points are rare enough. In this scenario, Chain 3 and Chain 4 each
start at different points but they end up at the same distinguished point. This
shows that somewhere along the line the two chains collided. When these
chains are reevaluated, it can be shown that point x2 and point x1′ both hash
to the same value. This is a hash collision, and this is the goal of the attack.
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The novel contribution from Oorschot and Wiener [12] was that this
method of finding collisions in hash functions provides a parallel speedup
that is directly proportional to the number of processors involved (a linear
speedup). Previously, the Pollard Rho algorithm (described later in Sec-
tion 2.3.3) had provided a parallel speedup which was proportional to the
square root of the number of processors. This thesis tests through real-world
experimentation the hypothesis that the method of computing hash chains
actually does yield a linear speedup.
2.1 CubeHash Algorithm
There are many variants of the CubeHash [2] algorithm. The particular
variant being used depends solely on three parameters, (r, b, h ). r is the
number of rounds performed after inserting a piece of the message into the
algorithm; b is the number of bytes to insert between r rounds; and h is the
number of bits to output as the final digest.
The rest of the CubeHash algorithm is composed of these steps:
1. Initialize a 128-byte state consisting of 32 32-bit Little Endian words.
2. Pad the message to be a multiple of 1 or more b-byte blocks.
3. For each b-byte block of the padded message: XOR the block into the
state.
4. Transform the state through r identical rounds.
5. Finalize the state.
6. Output the first h/8 bytes of the state.
Initialization is performed by setting the first three 32-bit words to the
values h/8, b, and r respectively. The remaining words are set to zero. Then
the state is transformed through 10r rounds. It is important to note that this
initialization step produces the same output for he same parameters r, b, and
h. Therefore, in the interest of saving time, this value can be precomputed
beforehand.
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To pad the incoming message, a 1 bit must be appended. Then 0 bits are
appended until the message is a multiple of b-bytes.
The round transformations are described in Section 2.1.1.
State finalization is performed by performing the XOR operation on the
last word of the state with the value 1. In essence, the least significant bit of
the last word is flipped. Then the state is transformed through another 10r
rounds to arrive at the final state.
The message digest is then taken to be the first h/8 bytes of the final state.
2.1.1 CubeHash Transformation
State transformation is performed 10r times after Initialization, r times after
b-byte blocks of the message are inserted into the algorithm, and 10r times



















Figure 2.2: One State Transformation in CubeHash. Inspired by [1].
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Figure 2.2 shows a single state transformation in CubeHash. This can be
evaluated as 10 different steps.
1. The first 16 words are added into the second 16 words.
2. The first 16 words undergo a bit rotation. Each word is rotated upwards
by 7 bits.
3. The first 16 words are swapped with each other. Each of these words
is swapped with the word that has the same index, but with the fourth
bit of that index flipped. Therefore, word 0 is swapped with word 8;
word 1 is swapped with word 9; and so on.
4. The second 16 words are XOR’d into the first 16 words.
5. The second 16 words are swapped with each other. Each of these words
is swapped with the word that has the same index, but with the second
bit of that index flipped. Therefore, word 16 is swapped with word 18;
word 17 is swapped with word 19; word 20 is swapped with word 22;
and so on.
6. The first 16 words are added into the second 16 words. Same as in
Step 1.
7. The first 16 words undergo a bit rotation. Each word is rotated upwards
by 11 bits.
8. The first 16 words are swapped with each other. Each of these words is
swapped with the word that has the same index, but with the third bit
of that index flipped. Therefore, word 0 is swapped with word 4; word
1 is swapped with word 5; and so on.
9. The second 16 words are XOR’d into the first 16 words. Same as in
Step 4.
10. The second 16 words are swapped with each other. Each of these words
is swapped with the word that has the same index, but with the first bit
of that index flipped. Therefore, word 16 is swapped with word 17;
word 18 is swapped with word 19; and so on.
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2.2 Structural Attacks on CubeHash
Structural attacks on a hash function are typically the most successful types
of attacks against a hash function. Structural attacks may find collisions,
preimages, or second preimages. However, the distinguishing trait of struc-
tural attacks is that they are almost always particular for a specific hash
function. This is because structural attacks exploit weaknesses within the
hash function itself, such as how state transformations are computed, etc.
15
2.2.1 Single Block Attacks and Statistical Tests on CubeHash
b bytes
b bytes 128 - b bytes S1
b bytes 128 - b bytes S2
b bytes 128 - b bytes S3
b bytes 128 - b bytes S4
b bytes 128 - b bytes S5
S
6









0x80 Message padded byte
1Finalization word
H
h / 8 bytes T
Figure 2.3: Processing a b-byte message through CubeHash. Inspired by [3]
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Figure 2.3 shows how a b-byte message would get processed through
CubeHash. This is the foundation of the attack proposed by Bloom and
Kaminsky [3]. The state S0 is the CubeHash internal state following the
initialization step, as described in Section 2.1. Then a b-byte message block
is directly XOR’d into the first b bytes of the state, leaving the remaining
(128 − b) bytes completely unaltered. This brings the state to S1. Then r
rounds are applied bringing the state to S2, the message padding byte (0x80)
is XOR’d into the state bringing the state to S3, r rounds are applied bringing
the state to S4, the finalization word is XOR’d into the state bringing the state
to S5, and lastly 10r rounds are applied to bring the state to S6. The hash
digest (labeled as H) is taken as the first h/8 bytes of S6 and the remaining
(128− h8) bytes (labeled as T) are discarded.
The novel idea proposed by Bloom and Kaminsky is that altering the
value of T does not in any way change the hash digest. Therefore, if one was
able to change the value of T and trace backward through the computation
and the last (128−b) bytes of S1 matched the last (128−b) bytes of S0, then
it would be trivial to find a message that would produce a second preimage.
Figure 2.4 on Page 17 illustrates this process.
Figure 2.4 shows the process of going backwards through the CubeHash
computation by supplying a desired hash digest to which a second preimage
should be found and any value of T that is not equal to the value of T for
the first message processed (if the value of H and T are the same as the
first message processed, then the same message will result). An appropriate
value for T requires a lot of trials, because, as shown in Figure 2.4, the last
(128 − b) bytes of S1 must match the last (128 − b) bytes of S0. Once a
match is found between these bytes, the desired alternate message may be
obtained by computing the XOR of the first b bytes of S1 with the first b
bytes of S0.
It should be noted that while this attack produces a second preimage
in less time than a brute force search, this attack is only feasible with an
extremely large value of b, well beyond the recommended values. Also, the
time required to perform this attack grows linearly with r.
The part of this attack that makes it a structural attack is how it relies
on the CubeHash method of taking the first h bits of the final state as the
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b bytes
b bytes 128 - b bytes S1
b bytes 128 - b bytes S2
b bytes 128 - b bytes S3
b bytes 128 - b bytes S4
b bytes 128 - b bytes S5
S
6




r reverse CubeHash rounds
r reverse CubeHash rounds
10r reverse CubeHash rounds
+ 0x80 Message padded byte
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Figure 2.4: Processing a b-byte Message in Reverse Through CubeHash. Inspired by [3]
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hash digest while discarding the remaining bits, the way that CubeHash
processes messages blocks (XOR), and the invertibility of the CubeHash
round function. This attack would not work for any other hashing algorithm
that does not have these components.
2.2.2 Inside the Hypercube
Class 32-bit words of CubeHash state
C1 : AABBCCDD EEFFGGHH IIJJKKLL MMNNOOPP
C2 : ABABCDCD EFEFGHGH IJIJKLKL MNMNOPOP
C3 : ABBACDDC EFFEGHHG IJJIKLLK MNNMOPPO
C4 : ABCDABCD EFGHEFGH IJKLIJKL MNOPMNOP
C5 : ABCDBADC EFGHFEHG IJKLJILK MNOPNMPO
C6 : ABCDCDAB EFGHGHEF IJKLKLIJ MNOPOPMN
C7 : ABCDDCBA EFGHHGFE IJKLLKJI MNOPPONM
C8 : ABCDEFGH ABCDEFGH IJKLMNOP IJKLMNOP
C9 : ABCDEFGH BADCFEHG IJKLMNOP JILKNMPO
C10 : ABCDEFGH CDABGHEF IJKLMNOP KLIJOPMN
C11 : ABCDEFGH DCBAHGFE IJKLMNOP LKJIPONM
C12 : ABCDEFGH EFGHABCD IJKLMNOP MNOPIJKL
C13 : ABCDEFGH FEHGBADC IJKLMNOP NMPOJILK
C14 : ABCDEFGH GHEFCDAB IJKLMNOP OPMNKLIJ
C15 : ABCDEFGH HGFEDCBA IJKLMNOP PONMLKJI
Table 2.1: Symmetrical Classes within CubeHash
An attack published by Aumasson, Brier, Meier, Naya-Plasencia, and
Peyrin [1] exploits the fact that the CubeHash round function, and the in-
verse of that round function, preserve symmetries within the 128-byte state.
The authors found 15 distinct classes of symmetries in CubeHash. They are
shown in Table 2.1. On the left side of Table 2.1 is the class index num-
ber and on the right are a series of letters. Each letter represents one 32-bit
word within CubeHash’s 1024-bit internal state. The same letter repeated
represents the same 32-bit word.
What happens in each of these classes of symmetry is that whenever
the CubeHash round function is processed on a symmetric state, the same
symmetry will be preserved, even though the particular words will change.
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C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3 : AAAACCCC EEEEGGGG IIIIKKKK MMMMOOOO
Table 2.2: Example of a Union Between Symmetric Classes
Furthermore, as shown in Table 2.2, the internal state may be composed
of multiple classes of symmetry. The example in Table 2.2 shows what the
internal state would look like if it were composed of symmetric classes C1,
C2, and C3.
The CubeHash algorithm however does have some protection against
symmetries. In the finalization step, as described in Section 2.1, the last
word of the state has its least significant bit flipped. This act breaks any
symmetry within the CubeHash internal state.
But the attack is not completely thwarted by the CubeHash finalization
step. The first step in the attack is to construct internal State0, which is
defined as the state that follows the initialization step as described in Sec-
tion 2.1. Then, from State0 process 2500 message blocks each through r
rounds to arrive at one class of symmetry, as shown in Table 2.1. Likewise,
work backwards from the final state, past the finalization step, and then in
reverse process 2500 message blocks to arrive at one class of symmetry, not
necessarily the same class as found previously. Then in the forward and the
backward direction process null messages (messages with only 0 bits) until
both the forward state and the reverse state are in the same set of symme-
tries. Then, in both directions process message blocks until a collision is
obtained. These last two steps are upper-bounded by 2256 operations.
So, this attack is capable of finding collisions in approximately 2501 com-
putations. However, such a high number is currently infeasible on current
technology, and the messages that are processed would be of unauthorized
length, over 2256 bytes. This makes the attack impractical.
The part of this attack that makes it a structural attack is that only Cube-
Hash has this particular set of symmetries, and only CubeHash preserves
this set of symmetries through its round function. This attack could not
apply to any other hashing algorithm, because all other hashing algorithms
have a different round function (if applicable) and a different internal state
(if applicable).
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Figure 2.5: Sets for a Meet in the Middle Attack
Another structural attack published by Khovratovich, Nikolic, and Wein-
mann [6] shows a meet in the middle attack. A meet in the middle attack
divides a problem into two smaller easier pieces and then the process of
combining the pieces should be simple enough that it doesn’t increase the
complexity beyond either of the smaller pieces. Overall, breaking the attack
into two pieces should be faster than working on the full problem.
In this scenario, there are two sets, S1 and S2. Each set contains multiple
CubeHash states, denoted by a lowercase s. s00 represents the state that im-
mediately follows initialization, as described in Section 2.1. From there S1
is filled with a chain of states by processing the round function, presumably
with a null message (a message containing only zero bits). sfn is the state
just prior to the finalization step and the message padding byte. S2 is filled
with a chain of states by processing the inverse round function, again with a
null message. n, the number of states in each set, is equal to 2
1024−8b
2 .
Once the sets are complete, there should be one state in S1 that matches
any state in S2 in all but the first b bytes. The XOR between the first b bytes
of these states is the message block that will get inserted at this point. So
the preimage will be a series of null message blocks, the result of the XOR
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as one message block, and then another series of null message blocks.
The memory requirement for this attack is nontrivial, and the gain over
a brute-attack is about 4 times fewer computations. A memoryless modifi-
cation to this attack is about 3 times more costly, which is roughly the same
complexity as a brute-force attack.
This attack is a structural attack, because it relies on the way CubeHash
processes null message blocks and it relies on invertible round function
within CubeHash. This attack would not work on another hash function.
2.3 Other Generic Attacks on Hash Functions
A generic attack, when used in the context of hash functions, is an attack
which does not depend on any particular hash function. This contrasts with
Section 2.2, because the attacks in Section 2.2 depend on specific imple-
mentation details in CubeHash. A generic attack may be applied to any
hash function. The success rate of generic attacks depends solely on com-
putational power and memory. Good cryptographic hash functions therefore
typically have a hash digest that is large enough to be computationally in-
feasible for any generic attack.
2.3.1 The Naı̈ve Collision Attack
Figure 2.6 illustrates the naı̈ve collision attack. The dots on the left repre-
sent values within the domain of the hash function, N, which is typically
anything between 0 and 264 bits or more depending on the particular hash
function. The dots on the right represent values within the range of the
hash function, S, which all have a fixed bit length which is also defined by
the hash function. The arrows represent computing the hash function and
arriving at a hash digest value, which is always within S. Messages are pro-
cessed one at a time through the hash function, usually sequentially but any
non-repeating pattern would suffice.
As the hash computations are performed, both the messages and their







Figure 2.6: Naı̈ve Collision Attack
Since S is finite and N is much larger than S, a collision must occur. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.6 with the second and third to last messages. The
two arrows point to the same hash digest in S but they originate from two
different points within N.
This attack will find a collision with probability 50% after evaluating
the hash function on the order of
√
2h times, where h is the length of the
hash digest in bits. The same number of messages and hash digests must
also be stored. This is derived from the well-known problem known as the
Birthday Problem. It should be noted that the complexity of this attack is
nontrivial with modern hardware for hash digests with 128 bits or more, and
the SHA-3 competition mandates a minimum of 224 bits. Many candidates







Figure 2.7: Naı̈ve Preimage Attack
2.3.2 The Naı̈ve Preimage Attack
Figure 2.7 illustrates the naı̈ve preimage attack. The dots on the left rep-
resent values within the domain of the hash function, N, which is typically
anything between 0 and 264 bits or more depending on the particular hash
function. The dots on the right represent values within the range of the hash
function, S, which all have a fixed bit length which is also defined by the
hash function. The white dot represents the hash digest value which is the
target for this attack. The arrows represent computing the hash function and
arriving at a hash digest value, which is always within S. Messages are pro-
cessed one at a time through the hash function, usually sequentially but any
non-repeating pattern would suffice.
As the hash computations are performed, the resulting hash digest value
is compared against the target hash digest value (represented by the white
dot in Figure 2.7). If any resulting hash digest value results in the target
hash digest value, then the attack is successful.
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This attack will find a preimage after evaluating the hash function on
the order of 2h times, where h is the length of the hash digest in bits. The
memory requirement is trivial. It should be noted that the complexity of this
attack is currently nontrivial with modern hardware for hash digests with
64 bits or more. And, as mentioned, the SHA-3 competition mandates a
minimum of 224 bits.



























Figure 2.8: Pollard Rho Collision Search
Figure 2.8 illustrates a more sophisticated collision attack that is based
on the Pollard Rho algorithm, and is described in [12]. The dots represent
values within the range of the hash function, S, which all have a fixed bit
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length which is defined by the hash function. The arrows represent comput-
ing the hash function.
This attack follows a hash chain until the chain loops back around onto
itself, thereby entering a cycle. The first step in the attack is to choose a
random point, and call it x0. Then produce the sequence xi = f(xi−1)
where f is the hash function, for i = 1, 2, ... . Since the space of the hash
digest is finite, the sequence must begin to cycle. Let xl be the point in
the sequence that exists just prior to entering the cycle (in Figure 2.8 this is
equivalent to x2). Therefore, xl+1 (x3 in Figure 2.8) must be on the cycle.
Let xc be the point on the cycle that precedes xl+1 (x10 in Figure 2.8). When
i = c the collision is found, because f(xl) = f(xc), but xl 6= xc. It is shown
in [12] that the number of points visited is
√
π2h−1, where h is the length
of the hash digest in bits. The advantage of this method, as stated by the
authors of [12], is that the memory requirement is small if a clever method
is used to detect a cycle. It should be noted that this method is infeasible for





The objectives of this thesis required a fast platform capable of varying de-
grees of parallelism. To meet this requirement, an FPGA cluster was used.
Each FPGA is capable of running 25 CubeHash engines, each CubeHash
engine running independently from each other. The results from each Cube-
Hash engine were collected in a MySQL database via a Java intermediary
server.
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture for the design in this thesis. On the left
are four independent Virtex-5 FPGA boards with a built-in PowerPC pro-
cessor. Each FPGA board ran a relatively recent version of the GNU/Linux
operating system, and each FPGA Accelerator could hold a total of 25 Cube-
Hash engines. On the right is a single desktop computer that ran both a cus-
tom Java-based server as well as a MySQL database. The Java server and
the MySQL database communicated with each other via a MySQL connec-




















Figure 3.1: System Architecture
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The PowerPC processor initiated a TCP connection with the Java server
in order to request work. The Java server sent work to each PowerPC pro-
cessor. To ensure maximum throughput, the Java server guaranteed that no
two PowerPC processors will be given the same work. The work that was
given to each PowerPC was a starting h-bit integer. The PowerPC commu-
nicated the starting integer to a particular CubeHash engine in the FPGA
Accelerator via a specialized kernel module that could read and write data
in FIFO queues on each CubeHash engine within each FPGA.
Each CubeHash engine then computed the CubeHash hash digest of the
starting integer using predefined r, b, and h parameters. If the resulting
hash digest did not match a specific pattern (specifically 25 leading zeros),
then the hash digest was fed back through the CubeHash hash algorithm to
produce a new hash digest. This cycle repeated until the hash digest matched
a specific pattern. If no match was found within 20 times the expected
chain length, the chain was aborted and a new chain was started. Once
the pattern was reached, the CubeHash engine communicated the final hash
digest and the number of hash iterations back to the PowerPC via the kernel
module. The PowerPC then sent that data to the Java server for storage on
the MySQL Database, and the PowerPC requested its next work load.
The Java server did some additional work with the MySQL database.
The Java server checked for hash-chains that ended up at the exact same
hash digest. These merged chains were stored in a separate MySQL table
for post-processing. The Java server also stored resume data so that it could
continue from previous results in the event of a power failure or a system
shutdown.
3.2 CubeHash Engine
Figure 3.2 shows the overall layout of the hardware in each CubeHash en-
gine (25 CubeHash engines were on each FPGA). At the bottommost layer
is the cubehash2 component which actually computes the CubeHash algo-








































































































































































































Figure 3.2: Layout of CubeHash Engine Components
30
Above that layer is the User Logic. The User Logic component provides
an interface between the Xilinx IP and the cubehash2 component. The User
Logic is responsible for taking data from the FIFO’s in the Xilinx IP and
translating that into a fixed length message for the cubehash2 component to
process, the output of which is sent back to the FIFO’s in the Xilinx IP.
The Xilinx IP is provided by Xilinx so that interaction between the Cube-
Hash engine and the PowerPC is possible. On the PowerPC side there is a














































































































Figure 3.3: CubeHash Implementation State Machine
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Figure 3.3 shows the state machine in the cubehash2 component as shown
in Figure 3.2. Whenever the incoming reset line becomes 0, the state ma-
chine asynchronously returns to the idle state. This is the only asynchronous
operation in this state machine, all other state changes are synchronous on
the rising edge of the incoming clk (clock) signal. The idle state is where the
state machine is to begin. In the idle state, the cubehash2 component does
nothing except wait for the incoming start line to become 1. In this state, the
outputReady and startACK (start acknowledgment) both output to 0. For all
of the other states, outputReady is equal to zero except in the output state.
Similarly, startACK is equal to 0 in only the idle and output states.
Once the incoming start line becomes equal to 1, the current state switches
to the init. The purpose of the init state is to initialize the CubeHash inter-
nal state (as described in greater detail in Section 2.1). By definition, the
internal state initialized by setting the first three 32-bit words to h/8, b, and
r respectively, and then processing the state through 10r rounds. However,
since the result of initialization is the same within any particular variant of
CubeHash (regardless of the message contents), these values can be pre-
computed to provide a fair speedup. If the value has been precomputed,
then the current state will immediately switch to the exor state. If the values
have not been precomputed, then the init state will set the internal variables
afterRound to exor and count to 10r, and then the current state will switch
to the round state.
The round state, as shown in Figure 3.3, is really the center point for the
state machine. The round state alters the current state by making one or
two comparisons. First, if the internal count variable is greater than 0, then
the round state will always switch into the radd1 state, and the round state
will decrement the value of count by 1 whenever it does this. Second, if the
internal count variable is equal to 0, then it will transfer the current state into
whichever state is stored in the afterRound variable. Using these internal
variables allows for a variable number of CubeHash round transformations
to be performed, and for control to automatically switch to the appropriate
state after all of the round transformations have been completed.
The radd1, rxor1, radd2, and rxor2 states stand for First Round Addi-
tion, First Round XOR, Second Round Addition, and Second Round XOR
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respectively. These states perform the most intensive work of the CubeHash
algorithm. The CubeHash round transformation (as better described in Sec-
tion 2.1.1) is composed of sixteen parallel 32-bit additions twice, sixteen
parallel 32-bit XOR operations twice, and a number of 32-bit word swaps
and bit rotations. In FPGA hardware, word swaps and bit rotations do not
suffer from any combinational gate delay. Any FPGA could do almost an
unlimited number of these operations within 1 clock cycle, because the re-
sult is precomputed by the compiler at compile time. However, XOR oper-
ations typically suffer from at least 1 gate delay, and 32-bit addition suffers
from multiple gate delays, depending on the specific implementation of the
adder. Therefore, the CubeHash round transformation was split into each of
the 4 tasks that require gate delays, and any preceding swaps or bit rotations
are bundled into the operation. The only exception is the very last operation
of the CubeHash round transformation which is a swap, in this case the last
swap is bundled into the rxor2 state. Each of these four states take exactly
one clock cycle and they are always encountered in succession, preceded by
the round state, and followed by the round state.
The exor state stands for XOR Message. In this state, the next b bytes
of the message are XOR’d into the first b bytes of the internal CubeHash
state. The internal count variable is always set to r in this state. If the last
b bytes of the message have been processed, then the internal afterRound
state gets set to finalize, otherwise it is set to exor. There are some endian
conversions that occur in this state, because CubeHash requires little endian
words, while VHDL addition by default operates on big endian words, but
as mentioned in the previous paragraph, swapping bytes does not have any
associated time cost since it is all precomputed by the compiler.
The finalize state has a very simple task. It XOR’s the last word in the
CubeHash internal state with the number 1 to essentially flip the least signif-
icant bit. Then, it sets the internal variables afterRound to output and count
to 10r before the current state switches back to round.
The output state is the only state that sets the outputReady signal to 1.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the hash digest is composed of the first h
bits of CubeHash internal state. So in the cubehash2 component (shown in
Figure 3.2), the outputHash is directly connected to the internal CubeHash
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state, and as such, its value is continually changing. Therefore the output
state allows an external component to know when it can read a valid Cube-
Hash digest from the outputHash signal. The output state transfers to the
idle state when start becomes equal to 0, although in practice usually the
reset value is set to 0 for one clock cycle instead.
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3.2.2 User Logic Implementation

































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: User Logic State Machine
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Figure 3.4 on Page 35 shows the state machine that operates within the
User Logic component, as shown in Figure 3.2. The purpose of the User
Logic component is to act as an intermediary between the cubehash2 com-
ponent and the Xilinx IP. Its functions are to take incoming starting words
from the PowerPC via the FIFO’s in the Xilinx IP. Then it starts the cube-
hash2 component to find the hash digest. If the hash digest is not a distin-
guished value, then the hash digest is fed back into the input of the cube-
hash2 component, and the cycle repeats until a distinguished value is ob-
tained. Once this happens, the User Logic component is then responsible
for writing the distinguished value and the number of hash iterations back
to the PowerPC via FIFO’s in the Xilinx IP.
The state machine in Figure 3.4 starts with a synchronous reset when-
ever the Bus2IP Clk becomes 1. This places the state machine into the IDLE
state, and it resets the internal count variable to 0. In the IDLE state, the state
machine waits for a new incoming word from the PowerPC. When a new in-
coming word is ready for input from the write FIFO, the WFIFO2IP empty
signal will become equal 0. When this happens, the IDLE state will set the
internal hashCount variable to 0 and set the signal IP2WFIFO RdReq to
1, and the state transfers into the RD REQ state. (It should be noted that
this variable, IP2WFIFO RdReq, is in italic in Figure 3.4. This convention
means that the value is only held for 1 clock cycle, and then in the next clock
cycle it is reset to 0.) The hashCount variable stores the number of values
in a hash chain, and the IP2WFIFO RdReq signals tells the Xilinx IP that
the CubeHash engine is ready to read a 32-bit value from write FIFO. In the
IDLE, the RD REQ, and the EVAL states cubeHashReset and startHashing
are equal to 0; in all other states they are equal to 1.
The purpose of the RD REQ state is to wait for acknowledgment from the
Xilinx IP that the 32-bit value has been received. The 32-bit value is shifted
in to a signal that will become the input value for the cubehash2 component,
but the shift only occurs once each time the state enters the RD REQ state
and only after a successful acknowledgment has been received. Once the
WFIFO2IP RdACK signal becomes equal to 1, that means the 32-bit value
has been received, and the state will change into the EVAL state. During this
state transition, the value of the internal count variable is incremented.
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The EVAL state determines whether the next state should be the IDLE
state or the WAITFORSTARTACK state. It makes this decision based on the
value of the internal count variable. If count is equal to 3 (meaning three
32-bit words have been shifted in), then the next state will be the WAIT-
FORSTARTACK state, otherwise it will be the IDLE state. The EVAL state
is part of a second cycle, as shown in Figure 3.4, and in that cycle it acts as a
way to reset the cubehash2 component, because the cubeHashReset signal
is set to 0 in the EVAL state.
The WAITFORSTARTACK state waits for the startHashingACK signal
to become 1. This only occurs once the cubehash2 component has started
computing the hash function. Once startHashingACK becomes 1, the state
machine transfers into the HASH state.
In the HASH state, the state machine waits for the outputReady signal to
become 1. This occurs only when the cubehash2 component has completed
computing the hash function and has a valid output hash digest ready. Once
outputReady becomes 1, the state machine transfers into the EVALHASH
state, and the internal hashCount variable is incremented.
The EVALHASH state is responsible for determining whether or not the
output hash digest is a distinguished value. If the output hash is a distin-
guished value, then the state machine transfers to the GETOUTPUTREADY
state. If the maximum number of points in a hash chain has been reached
(determined by the value of hashCount), then the output hash is turned into
all 1’s and the state machine transfers into GETOUTPUTREADY anyway;
this is to prevent unending hash chains from wasting FPGA cycles. If nei-
ther of the first two cases hold true, then the state machine transfers into
the EVAL state and the output hash digest is routed back to the input of the
cubehash2 component.
The GETOUTPUTREADY state sets the first 32-bit word of the out-
put hash (prefixed with 0 bits if necessary) ready for output, and once the
RFIFO2IP full signal becomes zero, the state signals the Xilinx IP to trans-
fer the 32-bit value into the read FIFO by setting the IP2RFIFO WrReq
signal to 1 and transferring to the WR REQ state.
The WR REQ state waits for an acknowledgment on the RFIFO2IP WrAck
signal, and when it receives that acknowledgment, it signals an interrupt on
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the IP2Bus IntrEvent line which tells the PowerPC driver (Section 3.3) that
a 32-bit word is available on the read FIFO. The state then decrements the
internal count variable and transfers to the EVAL2 state.
In the EVAL2 state, a decision is made whether to transfer back into the
WR REQ state or to transfer to the PREPCOUNT state. If the internal count
variable is equal to 0, then that means three 32-bit words have been trans-
fered to the PowerPC, so the state machine transfers into the PREPCOUNT
state. Otherwise, the EVAL2 state waits for the RFIFO2IP full signal to
become equal to 0, and then sets IP2RFIFO WrReq equal to 1 while trans-
ferring to the WR REQ state.
The PREPCOUNT state places the internal hashCount variable onto the
32-bit read FIFO and then waits until RFIFO2IP full equals 0, at which
point it sets IP2RFIFO WrReq equal to 1 and transfers to the WRITECOUNT
state.
The WRITECOUNT state waits for an acknowledgment that the hash-
Count variable has been written to the read FIFO. When the RFIFO2IP WrAck
line equals 1, the state sets IP2Bus IntrEvent equal to 1 and transfers back
to the IDLE state.
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3.3 PowerPC Software
The PowerPC processors that were coupled with the Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGAs
ran an embedded Linux distribution. Each Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA could hold
25 CubeHash engines. Embedded systems rarely have support for high-
level programming languages, such as Java, C++, and Python, due to the
limited storage space, limited memory, and limited processing efficiency.
Therefore, the C programming language was used to program the PowerPC
software.
The overall purpose of the PowerPC software is to act as an interme-
diary between the CubeHash engines and the Java server. The operations
of the Java server (as explained in Section 3.4) require strong multithread-
ing support and communication with a MySQL server. It may have been
possible to incorporate some of this functionality into the PowerPC’s, but
there would likely have been synchronization issues and there could have
been problems accessing MySQL from such a limited environment. In any
case, if the functionality of the Java server were to be solely placed on the
PowerPC’s, then there is no doubt that the PowerPC’s would become less
efficient.
On the other side of the PowerPC is the FPGA. After given a starting
value, the CubeHash engines compute the hash chain until either a distin-
guished value is found or a chain length grows too large, in which case
a result was given. These particular FPGA boards have support for net-
working, so in theory, they could have communicated directly with the Java
server. However, each CubeHash engine would have to share the Ether-
net port with the other hardware implementations and the PowerPC. The
logic involved in both operating the Ethernet port and sharing it would have
consumed a fair-sized portion of the FPGA hardware, thereby limiting the
amount of CubeHash engines that could be placed on each FPGA.
So, the PowerPC software fills the place between the CubeHash engines
and the Java server. The functions of the Java server are too high-level to
be replaced by the PowerPC, and the functions of the CubeHash engine
are too low-level to be able to communicate directly with the Java server.
Since the C programming language is easily capable of communicating on
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TCP sockets and working with file I/O, the PowerPC software can therefore
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Figure 3.5: PowerPC Software Overview
Figure 3.5 shows an overview of how the PowerPC software operates.
The PowerPC software first checks the command line arguments. If the
command line arguments are valid the PowerPC software then forks a sin-
gle child process for each CubeHash engine within the FPGA as specified
by the command line arguments. While the child processes are being cre-
ated, the parent process generates a Linux shell script that is able to termi-
nate each child process by process ID (PID). This shell script is useful in
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performing parallelization experiments, because multiple experiments can
be started and stopped on the FPGA. A sample shell script is shown in List-
ing 3.1. Each experiment has exclusive access to a set of CubeHash engines,
so they will not interfere with each other. The only possible interference
could be caused by process switching in the operating system, but even that
would be very minimal seeing as the child processes spend most of their
lives blocked waiting on I/O.
1 k i l l −9 3852
2 k i l l −9 3854
3 k i l l −9 3855
4 k i l l −9 3856
5 k i l l −9 3857
6 k i l l −9 3861
7 k i l l −9 3862
8 k i l l −9 3863
9 k i l l −9 3864
10 k i l l −9 3865
Listing 3.1: Sample Shell Script to Terminate Child Processes
As shown in Figure 3.5, after all of the child processes are created, the
parent process terminates. Each child process executes the Linux mknod
command to create a character device file to use for communication with
each CubeHash engine. This thesis uses a driver create by Jeremy Espen-
shade in his thesis [5]. The default build setup for the FPGA hardware
causes the major device numbers for each CubeHash engine to start at 254
and decrement from there. The minor device numbers are not used. Since
there are only at most 25 CubeHash engines per PowerPC processor, the
lowest major number used is 230.
After the particular character device file is created, the child process then
initiates a TCP connection to the Java server. The child process then blocks
waiting to read three 32-bit words from the TCP connection with the Java
server. After those three words are read from the TCP connection, they are
written to the character device file, which places them on the incoming FIFO
to that particular CubeHash engine on the FPGA. The child process then
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blocks reading four 32-bit words from that particular CubeHash engine’s
outgoing FIFO via the character device file. The first three words represent
the result of the computation, and the last word represents the number of
steps taken to reach that result. Once the four words are received from the
CubeHash engine, the child process sends them over the TCP connection
to the Java server. The child process then repeats the cycle, as shown in
Figure 3.5, by blocking on a read of the next three 32-bit words from the
TCP connection with the Java server.
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3.4 Java Software
Java was chosen as the language for the server for several reasons. Java has
support for SQL databases, and MySQL, a popular free and open source
SQL database, provides a Java connector package which allows Java pro-
grams to use a MySQL database. Java has strong support for multithreaded
applications. Java provides a LinkedList class which provides add and re-
move operations in constant time, which is very sufficient for passing data
between threads. And Java has a relatively simple networking API.
The overall purpose of the Java server is to provide a connection between
the PowerPC software (Section 3.3) and the MySQL database, and to pro-
vide the PowerPC software with unique starting values.
Figure 3.6 shows an overview of the threads and their tasks within the
Java server. The initial thread of execution in the Java server checks the
command line arguments, and then performs a number of setup functions.
It initializes the connection with the MySQL database, it checks to make
sure the required tables are present or creates them if necessary, it loads
experiment resume data if applicable, and then it launches three new threads
which run throughout the course of the experiment before the initial thread
terminates.
The first thread that is launched is called the OutputThread. Through-
out the server’s execution, it reports a number of events which are currently
going on, such as new PowerPC processes connecting over TCP, results
returned, collision found, etc. This thread’s sole purpose is to check a
LinkedList for string data, and if there is data in the LinkedList, it should
be removed from the LinkedList and printed to the output stream. The idea
behind the OutputThread is that the other threads in the server should run as
fast as possible, and writing to the output stream is a slow task compared to
adding a string to a LinkedList (which is a constant time operation), there-
fore if the time-critical threads could just write a string to a LinkedList and
a non-time-critical thread (OutputThread) took the time to write the strings
to the output stream, then the time-critical threads could perhaps obtain a
speedup.











Handle Incoming TCP Connection
Handle FPGA Work and Results
Prepare
MSQL
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new ClientHandler().start()
Figure 3.6: Overview of the Java Server Threads
handles the connection with the MySQL database. Nearly all of the MySQL
operations in an experiment are insertion operations into the same table.
It does not make sense to have multiple threads compete with each other
for access to the Java MySQL connector when the MySQL database itself
would have to provide some kind of thread synchronization anyway. There-
fore, multiple threads that need to insert data into the MySQL database
simply add that data to a LinkedList (in constant time) and the MySQL-
Handler thread removes that data and inserts it into the MySQL database.
The MySQLHandler has sole access to the Java MySQL connector after it
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is launched.
One special event that can, and does, happen during the experiments is
when a duplicate distinguished value is inserted into the same table. The
table is specially constructed within MySQL to only allow unique distin-
guished values, so the MySQL database will respond with an error message
if a duplicate value is entered. The MySQLHandler handles this error by
reading the current row containing the duplicate distinguished value and in-
serting the distinguished value and both sets of start and step data into a
special table for storage of such information.
The third thread that is launched is called the TCPConnectionHandler.
This thread simply listens on a TCP port and launches a new thread (Clien-
tHandler) to handle each new incoming connection. The listen backlog is
set to 100, which is equal to the maximum number of CubeHash engines on
the current hardware. The thread can only accept one connection at a time,
so the backlog is the number of pending requests that may await accep-
tance. If the number of incoming connections exceed the space available in
the backlog, then each connection exceeding the backlog will be refused. In
this experiment all connections should be accepted, which is why the back-
log is set to 100 (at any point in time there are at most 100 active CubeHash
engines).
There is one ClientHandler thread for each incoming connection. Con-
nections come from the PowerPC software as explained in Section 3.3. The
ClientHandler thread will send a unique starting value on its TCP connec-
tion and then wait to receive a distinguished value and the number of steps
it took to reach that distinguished value. Then, the starting value, the distin-
guished value, and the number of steps is passed off to the MySQLHandler
thread via a LinkedList, and the process repeats from the beginning.
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3.5 MySQL Server
MySQL Server is an open source relational database software which is
freely available for personal use. In this thesis, a MySQL server was used
to store data very efficiently and to be able to quickly detect colliding hash
chains. How this is accomplished is beyond the scope of this thesis. MySQL
was simply used as a black-box tool. There were 4 tables that were used
during the course of the experiment. The length of the binary fields were
dependent upon the desired hash length in the experiment. Also, within
the MySQL database, each experiment (with a set of 4 tables) was given
a unique prefix so that data from one experiment was not mixed with data






Table 3.1: Data Table
Table 3.1 describes the data table. The data table stores every hash chain
computed by the CubeHash engines. There are 3 fields. The first field is
called dval which stands for distinguished value. This field stores the dis-
tinguished value at the end of the hash chain. This field is also the primary
key for this table. That means that MySQL will automatically disallow any
two rows from containing the same dval. That is useful, because in the Java
server, as described in Section 3.4, whenever duplicate dval’s are placed in
this table, MySQL will report an error back to the Java server. This error is
evidence that two hash chains have collided. The second field in this table
is called start which stands for starting value. This is the value that was
given to a CubeHash engine to begin hash computations. This value is nec-
essary for post-processing, that is, stepping through two hash chains that are
known to collide in order to find the exact two points which hash to the same
value. The start field is not a keyed field, because the Java server ensures
that no two chains will start from the same starting value. The third field is
47











Table 3.2: Duplicate Table
Table 3.2 describes the duplicate table. It is very similar to the data
table as described by Table 3.1. Whenever two chains produce the same
distinguished value, it is impossible to store them in the data table due to
the primary key. So, both chains are stored in a row of the duplicate table.
If two chains are going to collide, the first chain to be computed is stored
in the data table. Then, after the second chain is finished computing, the
Java server will attempt (and fail) to store it in the data table. The Java
server will notice that the failure is due to a duplicate distinguished value
and will store both chains in a row of the duplicate table. It should be noted
that data is never removed from the data table, so the same chain will exist
in both the data and duplicate tables. This is intentional, because the data
table stores all unique distinguished values that have been found. It is also
intentional that the duplicate table does not have a primary key, because a
single distinguished value may be reached by more than just two chains, and
when this does happen, there are duplicate dval, start1, and steps1 fields.
When a chain is copied from the data table into the duplicate table, its fields
in the data table are placed in the start1 and steps1 fields. The new chain
that ends with the same distinguished value has its fields stored in the start2
and steps2 fields of the duplicate table.
The last three fields in the duplicate table are only used for post-processing.
In fact, the Java server does not store any data in these fields. An alternate
program uses these fields to step through the hash chains and find the two
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different messages which hash to the same value. The duplicate table is an
ideal place to store this information. message1 and message2 are the two
different messages, and commonHash is the hash digest of both messages.
Field Type Key
start binary None
Table 3.3: Resume Table
Table 3.3 describes the resume table. This table’s purpose is to allow the
search for hash collisions to continue in the event of a power failure or some
other disruption. This table was not used during performance testing. There
is only one field in this table and that is the start field. Whenever a new
hash chain began computation, its starting value was stored in this table.
Whenever a hash chain was completed and successfully stored in either the
data or duplicate table, its starting value would be removed from the resume
table. If the experiment were suddenly stopped and restarted (such as may
be the case in a power failure) then the Java server would read in the starting
values stored in this table and reissue them to CubeHash engines as they




Table 3.4: Loop Table
Table 3.4 describes the loop table. This is another table whose sole pur-
pose was for resuming computations. Again, this table was not used during
performance testing. There is only one field in this table and that is the start
field. There is a threshold to the maximum length of a hash chain, and that
was equal to the anticipated chain length times 20. If a CubeHash engine
exceeded that chain length, it would abandon the chain and request a new
one. Any starting value that led to a CubeHash engine abandoning the chain
was stored in the loop table. The name of the loop table comes from the situ-
ation where a chain actually loops back around on itself causing a loop such
as in the Pollard-Rho case. If, on that loop, no distinguished values were
present then the chain computation would continue indefinitely. Therefore,
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in an effort to reduce wasted computation time, whenever the experiment is
suddenly stopped and restarted (such as may be the case in a power failure),





All hash chains terminated when there were 25 leading zeros. Initially hash
lengths of 40, 48, 56, 64, and 72 bits were to be tested, but it was later found
that when using 40 and 48-bit hash lengths, the hash chains did not termi-
nate within the maximum allowable chain length (20 × 225), and therefore
measuring parallel speedup with these hash bit lengths would not have pro-
duced any meaningful results. So this thesis continues with only 56, 64, and
72-bit hash lengths.
4.1 Procedure
As explained in Section 3.1, there were a total of four FPGA nodes. Each
FPGA node consisted of a single FPGA and a single PowerPC processor.
Also, as mentioned in Section 3.3, the PowerPC ran an embedded Linux
environment which would talk to each CubeHash engine on the FPGA (de-
scribed in Section 3.2). There were a total of 25 CubeHash engines on each
FPGA. This resulted in a total of 100 CubeHash engines that could all per-
form CubeHash computations in perfect parallel.
The experiments were restricted such that each of the FPGA nodes could
only be programmed for one particular hash variant. For example, Node 1
could be programmed for the 64-bit implementation of CubeHash, and Node
2 could be programmed for the 72-bit implementation, but Node 1 could not
be programmed for both the 72-bit implementation and 64-bit implementa-
tion simultaneously.
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This allowed for some experiments to run simultaneously. Multiple ex-
periments running simultaneously has the potential to cause one experiment
to impede another through competition for hardware access. For exam-
ple, running two (or more) processes simultaneously on a desktop computer
with a single processor may cause the processes to compete with each other
for access to the processor, network card, and other hardware components.
However, this was determined to not be a problem for these particular exper-
iments due to two reasons. The first reason is that both the desktop computer
and each of the PowerPC nodes (the only two components where this may
occur) use a modern Linux operating system which is designed to fairly dis-
tribute limited hardware resources such as the processor, network card, etc.
between multiple processes. The second reason is that all of the software
processes involved in this thesis spend the majority of their time blocked
on I/O (the PowerPC waiting for a starting value from the Java server, the
PowerPC waiting for a result from a CubeHash engine, or the Java server
waiting for a result from the PowerPC), and whenever processes are blocked
on I/O, the Linux kernel is advanced enough to serve other processes that re-
quire more immediate attention. So, due to the fact that all of the processes
spent most of their time blocked on I/O, it was very unlikely for multiple
processes to request access to the same hardware at the same time. Even if
multiple processes happened to request access to the same hardware at the
same time, the Linux kernel could service the multiple processes in a time
that is on the order of perhaps no more than a few hundred milliseconds,
which is very insignificant compared to the size of the results, which was on
the order of hundreds of seconds at least.
To start an experiment, the desired nodes would be programmed with the
specific CubeHash variant. Programming a node involved placing an ACE
file on the FAT partition of a CompactFlash memory card. The ACE file
itself was composed of two different files. The first was the bitstream which
is a file generated by the Xilinx tools. This file contained all of the informa-
tion necessary for programming the FPGA. However, the other necessity in
the ACE file was the Linux kernel. The kernel had to be configured to be
compatible with the particular bitstream, otherwise the CubeHash engines
could not be utilized by the PowerPC. The kernel also held information
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(namely the Ethernet MAC address) which would allow the node to come
up and receive the proper IP address from the local network. Once the bit-
stream and the kernel were available, the ACE file was generated and the
scp program was used to transfer the ACE file to the FAT partition of the
CompactFlash memory card. Then the node was rebooted used the reboot
command, and upon startup the FPGA would be programmed. (If the node
did not reboot correctly, typically due to a faulty kernel, the CompactFlash
card would have to be manually ejected from the node and reprogrammed
using a different computer.)
Once the node was programmed, the Java server had to be launched.
The Java server took a number of command line arguments, including the
number of leading zeros in a distinguished value; the CubeHash parameters
r, b, and h (Section 2.1; the port which it would should listen on to receive
incoming TCP connections; and the number of processors that were to be
used in this experiment. These parameters helped to identify the unique
set of MySQL tables (Section 3.5) that should be used for the experiment.
Since the experiments were typically run remotely, and for long periods
of time, the GNU screen program was used to ensure that the experiment
would remain running even in the event of an SSH disconnect. Once the
Java server was launched, it would run indefinitely, listening for incoming
TCP connections and handling them appropriately.
The next step was to launch the PowerPC software. The PowerPC soft-
ware took a number of command line arguments as well. It took the hash
bit length, h; the largest device major number for the CubeHash engine; the
smallest device major number; the Java server IP or DNS address; the port
number that was listening on the Java server; and the name of shell script to
create to terminate the experiment (See Listing 3.1). The PowerPC software
was also executed in the GNU screen program to prevent accidental termi-
nation. Once the PowerPC software was launched, the experiment would
continue until it was manually terminated.
Experiments could be run in parallel by using different processes for the
Java server, each listening to a different port and using different MySQL
tables. Also, the PowerPC software could use a different range of major
device numbers to utilize different CubeHash engines.
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The number of CubeHash engines chosen to be utilized in each experi-
ment was determined by using powers of the
√
2 until the maximum number
of CubeHash engines (100) was used. This method was chosen because it
would produce a uniform horizontal spacing on a logarithmic scale, and
there would be 14 data points per hash bit length. Each data point is the
average interarrival time between finding the first 3 collisions.
The procedure repeated for each of the 14 data points for each of the 3
hash bit lengths: 56, 64, and 72-bits.
4.2 Results
P 56-Bit Hash 64-Bit Hash 72-Bit HashR S E R S E R S E
1 780 1.000 1.000 15226 1.000 1.000 375741 1.000 1.000
2 468 1.667 0.833 7428 2.050 1.025 187703 2.002 1.001
3 248 3.145 1.048 4881 3.119 1.040 125017 3.006 1.002
4 237 3.291 0.823 3659 4.161 1.040 93785 4.006 1.002
6 134 5.821 0.970 2410 6.318 1.053 62395 6.022 1.004
8 264 2.955 0.369 1777 8.568 1.071 46686 8.048 1.006
11 200 3.900 0.355 1209 12.594 1.145 33834 11.105 1.010
16 191 4.084 0.255 895 17.012 1.063 23192 16.201 1.013
23 54 14.444 0.628 598 25.462 1.107 16041 23.424 1.018
32 37 21.081 0.659 367 41.488 1.296 11462 32.781 1.024
45 51 15.294 0.340 196 77.684 1.726 8287 45.341 1.008
64 34 22.941 0.358 88 173.023 2.703 5662 66.362 1.037
91 23 33.913 0.373 180 84.589 0.930 3959 94.908 1.043
100 28 27.857 0.279 218 69.844 0.698 3590 104.663 1.047
Table 4.1: Table of Measurements
Table 4.1 shows the measured results from the experiments. P is the num-
ber of active processors (CubeHash engines). R is the average interarrival
time between finding a collisions, expressed in seconds. S is the speedup
which is defined as the average interarrival time for 1 proccessor divided by
the average interarrival time for p processors (R1Rp ). And E is the efficiency


































































































Figure 4.3: Efficiency vs Number of Processors
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Hash Bit Computations to Theoretical Computations Percent
Length h First Collision to First Collision
√
2h Difference
56 341,409,769 268,435,456 +27.15%
64 1,688,899,546 4,294,967,296 −60.68%
72 64,432,211,152 68,719,476,736 −6.24%
Table 4.2: Measured vs Theoretical CubeHash Computations to First Collision




Table 4.3: Minimum Number of Chains Before Three Collisions are Found
4.3 Analysis of Results
The primary objective of this thesis was to determine if this generic at-
tack on CubeHash could yield a linear speedup by adding more processors.
The plots in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 are constructed using the data from
Table 4.1.
The plot in Figure 4.1 shows the average interarrival time of collisions
vs the number of processors. This plot is useful in that it shows there is a
general trend for each hash variant tested to gain some kind of speedup as
more processors are added. The 72-bit hash variant shows this very well,
but the 64-bit hash variant has more deviation, and the 56-bit hash variant
has even more deviation.
The plot in Figure 4.2 shows the speedup vs the number of processors.
Here it can be seen that there is a consistent speedup obtained with the 72-
bit hash variant, however again the 64 and 56-bit hash variants are showing
more deviation.
The plot in Figure 4.3 shows the efficiency vs the number of processors.
Here it is clearly visible that a linear speedup is obtained in the 72-bit hash
variant, because the 72-bit hash variant sticks very close to an efficiency of
1, and an efficiency of 1 means that the task is evenly divided among all of
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the processors, and the work is completed at the theoretical limit. The 56
and 64-bit hash variants start off close to an efficiency of 1, but they quickly
move away from an efficiency of 1 as the number of processors increases.
The 64-bit hash variant’s efficiency grows to nearly 3. This is the result of a
speedup anomaly, which occurs when the ordering of work, not necessarily
the processing power, causes a speedup.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show why 72-bit hash variant was able to exhibit an
efficiency of 1, but the 56 and 64-bit hash variants moved away from an
efficiency of 1. Table 4.2 shows the number of CubeHash computations that
were performed in order to arrive at the first collision for each hash variant,
and it shows what the theoretical number of hash computations is as well
as the percent difference in the two numbers. Here it is shown that the 72-
bit hash variant had approximately the same number of computations until
the first hash collision as theory would predict, exhibiting only a 6.24% de-
crease. The 64-bit hash variant was able to find the first collision in many
fewer computations than theory predicted, exhibiting a 60.68% decrease.
This sharp decrease in the number of computations until the first collision is
obtained and the spike in efficiency for the 64-bit hash variant as the num-
ber of processors increased may mean that using a distinguished value of 25
leading zero bits perfectly suited the 64-bit hash variant. The 56-bit hash
variant however actually reported an increase in the number of hash compu-
tations that it had to perform compared to theory’s prediction, exhibiting a
27.15% increase. This increase implies that each hash chain may have been
too large to obtain a high efficiency. When there are 25 leading zero bits in
a distinguished value, the average hash chain length is expected to be 225 or
33,554,432. Fewer leading zero bits may have provided a better efficiency
for the 56-bit hash variant. Table 4.3 further supports the reasons stated
why the 64 and 56-bit hash variants did not exhibit the same efficiency as
the 72-bit hash variant. Table 4.3 shows the minimum number of chains that
must have been computed in order to find the first 3 collisions. In the 72-bit
hash variant, 4,158 hash chains had to be computed. This is a large enough
number that even the maximum of 100 processes could all be evenly loaded,
because each hash chain is computed by 1 CubeHash engine. However, the
64-bit hash variant required only 136 chains to be computed before the first
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3 collisions could be found. This does not provide for even loading, be-
cause, in the case of 100 processors, each processor would compute at least
1 chain, but only 36 had to compute a second chain. The uneven loading
between processors is likely the cause of the deviation in speedup and effi-
ciency. Also, the 56-bit hash variant only had to compute 14 chains before
all 3 collisions were found. This explains why the efficiency dropped as
more processors were added; the extra processors didn’t perform any mean-




In conclusion, this thesis was a success. The objective, which was to de-
termine if the hash chain concept proposed by [12] actually did linearly
increase with the number of additional processors, was proven to be true
for the 72-bit hash variant. The 56 and 64-bit hash variants did not exhibit
an efficiency of 1 as the number of processors increased, but using a fewer
number of leading zeros or searching for a larger number of collisions may
improve the efficiency of parallelizing these hash variants in this algorithm.
It should be noted that although collisions were easily found in these
hash variants, the number of processors required to find a collision in a full-
scale implementation of CubeHash is still too numerous for this attack to
be feasible. Also, the memory requirement would certainly be a nontrivial




A few interesting phenomena were observed throughout the course of this
thesis. The first of which was that the number of leading zeros in a distin-
guished value could not be chosen to be arbitrarily high. In the case of the
proposed 40 and 48-bit hash digests, 25 leading zeros was too large. There
were no hash chains found of those bit lengths that led to a distinguished
value with 25 bits. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to adjust the num-
ber of leading zeros in a distinguished value.
Another interesting occurrence was that in long runs, longer than the
experiments recorded in this thesis, hash chains would hit the same dis-
tinguished value many times. This could be an anomaly in the CubeHash
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Table A.1: Collisions Found in CubeHash16/32-56











Table A.2: Collisions Found in CubeHash16/32-64
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Table A.3: Collisions Found in CubeHash16/32-72
